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Tertullian, De Spectaculis 8.9
WE ARE TOLD THAT PAUL, while walking through Athens, was ''provoked in spirit'' when he ''saw (theōrountos) the city was full of idols (kateidōlon). '' 2 Through Paul's affronted eyes we get a glimpse of how people in the late antique Mediterranean liked to see their gods. One way of doing this was by rendering them in material form: in statues, in paintings, in mosaics, in temples, on street-altars, on vessels, on bathhouse walls, over gateways and above entrances. However, the notion that sight was a fundamental means by which to access the divine did not necessarily lead to a theology of images. Philo, another first-century Jew, makes it very clear that the eyes, while crucial to the discovery of and journey On one level, I am concerned with how such images or ''idols'' make their way into texts. Texts-in this case, late antique rabbinic texts-have a role to play beyond corroborating material evidence. They can supply answers to certain kinds of questions about images and viewing habits that the extant images alone do not necessarily guarantee. 7 This point is corpus of responses and attempts to frame and tame that which is seen. These sources exclude or occlude certain perspectives, persons, and objects from their purview. Precisely because of their partial vision, rabbinic writings allow us to account for the rabbis' viewing habits as well as to trace how they sought to legislate vision as part of a wider effort to impose their perspective on their world.
One important example of the ways in which rabbinic sources make images visible and viewing habits manifest, particularly as sites of conflict and resistance, is through the concept and vocabulary of idolatry or 'avodah zarah. While the notion of idolatry is biblically based, one cannot underestimate the ways in which the rabbis and others granted it ongoing life and reinvention. Idols are obviously not born but are made in both senses of construction.
14 The web of rabbinic laws on idolatry itself situates the idolatrous nature of an image chiefly in the eye of the beholder (rabbi, as well as worshiper). It is precisely this eye that is my focus here.
One reason why I choose to focus my inquiry on idols is because these visual objects seem to have elicited a particular kind of visual response and framing, not only on the part of ancient rabbis but also on that of modern scholars. Idols are troubling images, having played an important role in the writing of Jewish history and having served as a curious kind of red herring. Their prohibition has given Jews a reputation for iconoclasm and aniconism, and even for antipathy toward the sense of vision itself. Conversely, idols have been represented as a particularly Jewish vice. 15 The rhetorical figure of the sacrilegious, blind, or idolatrous Jew has yet to be utterly dislodged from our own historical lenses. 16 The ancient rabbis are often the locus classics of this supposed antipathy toward images (and, by logically fallacious extension, vision more broadly). Others have already complicated the picture of the late antique ''artless Jew'' and the iconophobic rabbi.
17 I wish to show how even the most ''extreme'' forms of rabbinic disengagement with ''idols'' partook in the contemporary visual koine.
At the risk of oversimplification, but at the gain of categorical convenience and clarity, one might talk of three rabbinic modes of idol-viewing. The first is ''halakhic forensics.'' Rabbinic sources, especially in the tractate 'Avodah Zarah, provide a rabbis'-eye view onto a world full of religious objects, images, statues, and gods. Whether deliberately or inadvertently, the rabbis attended to and recorded various details of the appearances of objects. This is part of the wider realm of visual discernment through which the rabbis attempt to identify and categorize things in the world, for epistemic and evidentiary purposes. However-and this is the main reason that I am not treating this mode here-the act of viewing in this case is only treated implicitly through description and presentation of graphic details of visual objects, but it is not addressed, described, or announced, in and of itself.
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The second viewing strategy might be simply termed ''looking away.'' The third strategy, ''looking awry,'' addresses one problem that surfaces 16 with ''looking away.'' By not looking one might actually be affirming the power of the ''idol'' and granting it a grudging sanctity. We will see how this potential critique of ''looking away'' surfaces in the Palestinian Talmud. An alternative would be to deliberately engage the image through the eyes in a way that negated reverential gazing and neutralized the image's power by ''looking awry.'' A mode related to ''looking awry'' is ''liturgical looking''-a viewing practice in which the visual object is seen and ritually encoded with a curse.
In this essay I will concentrate on examples of ''looking away'' and ''looking awry,'' with a brief look at ''liturgical looking.'' I argue that all these viewing modes-even, or especially, ''looking away''-were attuned to contemporaneous ideas about the physical and spiritual mechanics of vision in general, and as they pertained to sacred images in particular. This tannaitic source attempts to explain the biblical prohibition in Lev 19.4. 21 The first interpretation reads ''turn'' (p-n-y/h) in the sense of turning toward in worship. R. Judah claims to understand p-n-h in its literal sense (vada'y), thus reading the verse as a prohibition against the very looking at idols.
19. I will be focusing on Palestinian sources here. I treat the relevant Babylonian sources in my book There are several ways to understand R. Judah's intervention. It could be extending the reach of the prohibition in A by enacting a precautionary measure so that even actions short of worship (such as looking) are prohibited. 22 Another possibility is that R. Judah specifically focuses on vision as something meaningfully related to idolatry. His interpretation may point to looking part of what it means ''to worship'' (in A). Before weighing in on these possibilities let us unpack R. Judah's apparently simple intervention.
As a hermeneutic term, vada'y signals that the relevant interpretation follows the ''plain meaning'' of the biblical text, sometimes in contrast to a figurative reading. 23 Thus R. Judah's reading is marked as consistent with the literal meaning of p-n-y, so that the command al tifnu el ha-'elilim directly forbids looking at idols. 24 The root p-n-y commonly means to ''turn'' in either literal or figurative senses (as in A); in some contexts it can have the narrower meaning of ''look'' (as in B).
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In this particular case to ''turn'' would conform to the ''plain meaning'' of the text as much as, if not more than, to ''look. ' 184-91). However, in its local context of Lev 19.4, p-n-y is not being used in its visual sense. Lev 19.31 and the nearby Lev 20.6 use p-n-y to warn against ''turning to'' mediums and soothsayers. These instances use the root p-n-y in the sense of ''turn towards,'' in a metaphorical or affective fashion rather than in the literal sense ''facing'' or ''looking.'' However, early rabbinic midrash did not necessarily concern itself with the larger contexts of meaning, preferring to treat smaller units (words, phrases, verses) of the biblical text.
26. To my knowledge the characterization of ''looking'' as the common or plain sense of the verb p-n-y is unusual in tannaitic sources. The Sifra provides other interpretations of this verb including ''turning towards in worship'' (as per 540 JQR 102.4 (2012) literal (and also hyperphysical) reading of the root is somewhat strained. All this is to say that explaining the content of his prohibition as an unremarkable hermeneutic reflex or standard rigorist precaution does not sufficiently account for the particularity of claiming that a ban on looking at idols plainly arises from Lev 19.4. 27 The parallel in tShab 17.1 suggests that R. Judah's interpretation is not a run-of-the-mill rabbinic stringency:
A. Writing that goes under figures (tsurot) or icons (yokna'ot) one does not look (en mistakelin) at it. 27. The reading is sufficiently an imposition onto the verse-phrase for us to seek explanations outside of rabbinic hermeneutic considerations alone.
28. The prohibition of looking (s-k-l) at inscriptions under images is noteworthy. The common verb is reading (k-r-a), which literally means ''cry out.'' This reflects the fact that in antiquity texts were usually read out loud. For the view that the prohibition against ''looking'' refers to reading, see Lieberman, Tosefta ki-fshutah 2:282 and references therein. When one considers the way s-k-l is used again in the second part of the sentence, this reinforces a visual understanding of the verb (i.e., looking). Looking even without the ability to read would have been enough in order to approximate the content of inscriptions under sacred images, which usually contained dedications and, often, invocations of deities. As Lehmann puts it, ''One did not have to read the inscription to know that it contributed to the Roman system of values,'' Clayton Lehmann, ''The City and the Text,'' in Caesarea Maritima: A Retrospective after Two Millennia, ed. A. Raban and K. G. Holum (Leiden, 1996) , 388. Examples of ''looking'' at image-related inscriptions include Acts 17.23, Mk 12.13-17. Cf. bShab 149a, which substitutes ''look'' for ''read;'' tShab 13.16.
29. The form ''do not do X, and not only this, but do not do Y'' appears repeatedly in Shab. So does the form ''do not do X on the Sabbath, and not only this, but do not even do X during the week (e.g. tShab 2.9; 7.23; mShab 6.10;
In this case, looking at legends underneath an image is forbidden on the Sabbath, on top of a general weekday prohibition not to look at the images themselves. There is no metahermeneutic gloss of vada'y even as the Tosefta indicates the exegetical derivation by citing the lemma. In this context, the purpose is to justify the ban on looking at idols rather than to interpret the biblical phrase. As such, the ban against looking assumes its own integrity here as an everyday baseline of acceptable behavior vis-à -vis idolatrous images. There is no sense in which it is presented as a precautionary ban designed to prevent one from ''turning toward idols. '' 30 In its language and its reference to legends beneath images, the Tosefta gestures more to contemporaneous Greco-Roman visual, sculptural, and inscriptional culture than to biblical hermeneutics.
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This brings us back to the possibility that R. Judah's ban on looking at idols may be a commentary on what it means ''to turn to worship them. '' 32 It is noteworthy that in the third century, Hippolytus claimed that the (first-century) Essenes did not ''carry, look at (horā n) or make images (eikona). '' 33 This possibility that looking alone was understood as part of the worship of idols seems to be realized in later sources, as our tannaitic tradition spawns and is linked to a line of rabbinic reasoning that highlights the withholding of the gaze and its relationship to idolatry.
There is evidence that ancient Jews, and among them the tannaim, understood that looking at certain visual objects (in general) could have very real effects upon the beholder (or the object). 34 Certainly, belief in tShab 16.22). tShab 17.1 cannot be read (solely) in the context of bans on reading business documents since the prohibition is against looking rather than reading. Moreover, those prohibitions against reading on the basis of inappropriateness for Sabbath tend to explicitly declare themselves as such, as do the precautionary prohibitions (e.g., mShab 1.3; mShab 16.1; tShab 1.8). Compare the reading prohibition in tShab 17.8, as well as the restriction on consulting figures for calculation from certain sources ''as one does during the week,'' in tShab 17.6. For additional reading prohibitions, see mShab 16.1, tShab 1.13, tShab 13. the dangers of vision, exemplified in notions like the evil eye or the erotic power of sight, is attested in early Roman Palestine and beyond. 35 Underpinning such concerns about vision were both popular and philosophical understandings of its workings.
ANCIENT VISUAL THEORY
In the ancient and late ancient world, vision was generally understood to be intromissive (caused by something entering the eye), extramissive (enabled by something coming out of the eye), or a combination of both. 36 Atomists thought that vision was intromissive, believing that it occurred through material eidōla or simulacra being conveyed from physical objects to the eye. 37 Plato was an extramissive visual theorist whose understanding of vision continued to have great currency in Late Antiquity. He theorized that when there is light, a ''visual current'' issues from the eye, coalesces with the light, and strikes the object of vision.
38 He believed that the object emanates particles and that ultimately the data is transmitted to the soul. Stoic philosophy held that vision was a combination of visual currents that emitted from the eye and light. Rays emitted by the eye were thought to interact with the illuminated air forming a tensed field (in the shape of a cone). This ''extension'' of the eye touches the shapes of objects and transmits the information back to the eye. Along with Platonism, stoicism was a vital philosophical tradition in Late Antiquity, informing ideas about vision from the Gospels to Galen.
(''enlightening the eyes''); yMK 3:1, 81d; SifreDt 343; Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, Bah . odesh 2 (ed. Horowitz-Rabin, 210-11), and 9 (ed. Horowitz-Rabin, 235).
35. The highly influential Galen (129-200 C.E.) adopted and adapted elements of stoic understandings of vision (together with the findings of the Alexandrian anatomists such as Rufus of Ephesus). He argued that visual spirit (or pneuma) comes from the eye, which combines with the air to ''become for us the kind of instrument that the nerve in the body is at all times. '' 39 All of these ancient theories of how the eye works assume an intertwining between vision and touch, and a corporeal contact between viewer and visual object. Hence the malevolent gaze can negatively impact what is seen, and the seductive gaze or striking object can stimulate or affect the visual object or subject. Evidence from all levels of cultural production from the elite and rarified to the more popular and widespreadincluding medical and gynecological writings, optics, mathematics, philosophy, romances, magical materials, graffiti, religious texts, and material artifacts-shows that some combination of these ideas were current in the cultural koine of the late antique Mediterranean and Near East. 40 Such notions of sight also operated in a variety of Greek Jewish sources. 41 For instance, Philo worked with platonic notions of sight. He not only granted it a central role in his religious philosophy but also presented it as a peculiarly Jewish capacity. He describes the vision of the divine as the eyes ''touching the Eternal. ' understanding their laws to be oracles delivered by God, and having been taught this lesson from the earliest age, they carry as a statue in their souls (agalmatophorousi) the images (eikonas) of the ordained laws. Then, beholding (kathorōntes) the visible (enargeis) figures and forms of these, they are continually amazed at them.
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These heart-borne images of the Torah laws elicit a positive form of visual piety that is contrasted with the negative and idolatrous beholding of Gaius's images. Philo's Jewish leaders refuse to even look upon the latter, declaring that they would rather have their eyes (ophthalmois) struck out before ''seeing (theasōmetha) what no one of our ancestors ever saw (eide). '' 44 In order to emphasize the very real effect that beholding idolatrous images would have upon their sensory and spiritual sensibilities, they invoke the Gorgon: 45 Consider, if some of our people should see (theasainto) the statue (andrianta) escorted through into the shrine, would they not turn into stones, with their joints becoming frozen, their eyes (ophthalmōn) becoming frozen, so that they were unable to move? 46 Here is a graphic example of intromissive visual theory in which seeing an object has a mimetic effect upon the beholder: by beholding a statue the (literally) petrified viewer becomes one. 47 The seriousness with which vision was taken was bound up with its haptic nature. Sensitivity to sight is at play in Philo and in the writings of the early Church fathers. Writing in North Africa and in Egypt around the end of the second century, Tertullian and Clement focused on violence (the spectacles) and sex (women, idolatrous images) as dangerous visual objects. Tertullian argues that if we are careful about what goes into our mouths and stomachs, we should surely keeping our ''nobler organs'' free from the defilement of idolatry and that we ought to have no 48 In his exhortation to virgins to cover their heads, Tertullian is even more explicit regarding the relationship between vision and touch, describing how the uncovered virgin is ''penetrated by the gaze of untrustworthy and multitudinous eyes.'' 49 The Palestinian amoraim would have recourse to similarly graphic understandings of the (male) gaze.
Clement of Alexandria advises that ''the eyes especially are to be sparingly used, since it is better to slip with the feet than with the eyes.'' 50 He cautions that ''languishing looks, and ogling, which is to wink with the eyes, is nothing else than to commit adultery with the eyes, lust skirmishing through them.'' 51 On the other hand, he admits that ''the eye contemplating beautiful objects (kala) gladdens the heart; that is, the eye which has learned rightly (kalōs) to see, gladdens.'' 52 Rabbis and Christians attempted to guard their prospective followers' eyes from risky objects about the landscape, understanding that ''good'' seeing not only entailed vigilance but was something that required cultivation.
LOOKING AS WORSHIP
If late ancient notions of vision underscored sight's sensitivity, then perhaps the important role that this sense assumed in the realm of the sacred is unsurprising. It is by now a commonplace that central to late antique religion was the impulse to ''see the gods,'' whether in sculpture, painting, dream, or apparition. 54 We see this desire played out from the biblical psalms, to ancient Greek pilgrimage rituals, to a flurry of second-and third-century sources including Lucian's De Dea Syria, Pausanias's descriptions of statues' display or concealment, and Philostratus's descriptions of images. 55 The same is true for rabbinic traditions about the pilgrimage sights in the halcyon Temple days.
In the third century, Plotinus exploited the importance of the visual, sensory, and material nature of the divine images in his mystical philosophy. He commended the sages of old for this way of capturing the eidos, form or image of the gods in matter. 56 Almost a century later Julian vividly expressed the delight in seeing images, particularly those of the gods: Therefore, too, whoever loves the gods, does he not gaze steadfastly (horōntas) upon the statues (agalmata) and the images (eikonas) of the gods, worshipping and at the same time shuddering at the gods looking at him (horōntas) from the unknown (lit. unseen, aphanous).
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Seeing is bound up with pleasure, deep affect, and physical responsiveness. It is a reciprocal experience in which one not only sees but is also seen. All of this points to a flowering of what Elsner calls ''mystic'' or ''ritualcentered viewing.'' 58 Elsner shows how cult images from the second century mandated this viewing. He notes an increase of symbolic (rather than naturalistic) depiction of figures in cultic contexts from late Roman to Byzantine periods (that ultimately culminated in the Christian visual idiom of the icon). These, with their frontal gaze, incorporate the viewer, ''eyeballing those that approach into submission. '' 59 Key to this sacred viewing is a shared gaze between viewer and image. 60 That the tannaim thought of the divine-human ocular encounter in terms of a reciprocal vision of this kind comes through in their (re)invention of the thrice-yearly pilgrimage, particularly in what they designated as re ' ''He will see the face of the Lord (Ex 23.14)''-just as he comes to see (yir'eh) so he comes to be seen (yera'eh). 62 In such a visual economy, one way out, perhaps the only way, is to disengage the eyes. The prohibition of looking per se would make sense-even beyond rigorisms-in a world in which vision is no casual affair and in which seeing is essential to the ritual experience of the sacred.
AVERTING THE GAZE IN THE YERUSHALMI
The rabbis increasingly worked with such notions of sight to picture and frame a world of their own. We see a marked turn toward the visual by the amoraim, as well as explicit invocation of visual theories, and in our particular case of idol-viewing, an expansion of ocular options available.
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In the later sources we find the ban on looking embedded and modified in new settings. The prohibition is limited to ''idolatrous'' images in certain contexts, and there may be cause to look if the circumstances are right.
A. Asyan the carpenter in the name of R. Yoh . anan: Why are the images (ikoniyot) forbidden? Because they offer incense to them at the time that they go up. B. Said R. Yoh . anan: it is permitted to look at them (liro'tan) at the time that they go down. shipped. 65 Besides determining which objects are forbidden, the Yerushalmi seeks to discover which acts are proscribed (whether they constitute worshipful behavior or benefit, hana'ah).
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The initial prohibitive logic in A depends on the occurrence on cultic activity. R. Yoh . anan works on the presumption that incense is offered to a cult image upon its erection. Even after a cult image had been consecrated, offerings of fruit, incense, flowers, cakes, wine, or grain were presented to objects (ranging from imperial images to small paintings of domestic gods to grander statues of divine beings).
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The ensuing tradition in B, also attributed to R. Yoh . anan, implies what follows in C; part of the prohibition with respect to these presumptively idolatrous images is their beholding. While the editorial logic of the pericope (read as a whole) puts exception (B) before rule (C), the literary effect is heightened: the consecration upon the ascent of an image that forbids it to the Jewish gaze (''when they go up'') is reversed upon its comeuppance or descent (''when they go down''). It is following this that our tannaitic tradition is cited.
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What was a blanket prohibition now grants the opportunity to look in the right circumstances. These are those that cannot possibly be conceived of as cultic viewing, and which allow the Jewish witnessing of idoloclasm. The rise and fall of an idol is choreographed via two Jewish ocular responses based on two different biblical verses mandating looking away and looking toward (Lev 19.14; Ps 37.34). It is hard not to think about what later scholars refer to as damnatio memoriae-desecration or destruction of imperial images, or in later times similar destruction of ''idols'' by Christians-gleefully documented in various sources. 69 Even if a viewer was thought to absorb what was seen, we can understand (as the Yerushalmi's editor did) that in certain contexts an image's status and power are neutralized. 70 R. Yoh . anan, who is demonstrably sensitive to the way worship invests an image with (illicit) sanctity (in 65. The question ''why are icons forbidden?'' (A) continues to address the concerns of the underlying mishnah (mAZ 3.1). The Yerushalmi goes on to narrow and refine the worship-based criteria of the prohibition, distinguishing between categories of images that can be presumptively identified as subject to worship (e.g., imperial cult images vs. images of local authorities 71 In this regard, one might say that the gaze participates somehow in the destruction itself. 72 That looking is crucial here rather than incidental or merely a rigoristic precaution is evinced by the implication in R. Yoh . anan's statement (B)-that the default position is to not look at idols-as well as by the way sight repeatedly surfaces in this portion of the tractate.
What immediately follows these halakhic deliberations is obviously linked by the thematic of this idolatrous visuality: ''When R. Nah . um bar Simai died, they covered the icons (ikonta) with mats. They said, just as he did not look (h . amtun) at them when he was alive, so he should not look (yah . minun) at them during death.'' A few lines later we are informed that this is the rabbi who was called ''Nah . um the holy of holies'' ''because he did not gaze at the image on a coin (shelo' hibit betsurat matbea') his whole life. '' 73 Even if such behavior was seen as super-saintly, as is clear from R. Nah . um's title, it is also one very logical outcome of a ban on idol viewing. In spurning all images it does not distinguish between cultic and other images. Undeniably, it thereby answers the potential problem inherent in making that very distinction: how to identify the status of an image without perchance coming to gaze upon an idol?
What is so interesting about R. Nah . um's vigilance, even postmortem, is the implication that the dead continue to see. The Yerushalmi addresses this and concludes that the righteous dead do actually see and hear. In making this determination the Yerushalmi highlights sensory perceptionreminding us of what is at stake in the refusal to see. Following this exemplary anecdote is the report that Rabbi was called ''our holy rabbi'' because he never gazed (shelo' hibit) upon his circumcision. While one could understand the refusal to look at the penis as a precaution against 71. Eusebius, Life of Constantine, 3.54-57; Eusebius, Theophany 1.18; 4.3, 16, 20.
72. The rabbis even invest the removal of idolatry with liturgical significance as per mBer 9.1 and tBer 6.2.
73. yAZ 3.1, 42c (par. yMeg 1.11, 72b.) Given that R. Yoh . anan has just implied that all looking at idols is forbidden other than in specific circumstances, why does R. Nah . um bar Simai deserve special praise? This is probably due to R. Nah . um's abstention even from images on coins (a few lines below). Given that the Yerushalmi does distinguish idols from images in terms of veneration, it is questionable whether images (even of gods) on coins fall into the category of idol. 550 JQR 102. 4 (2012) touching, it seems, especially in this context, hard to ignore the common view that vision itself was intertwined with touch. 74 That the rabbis understood the gaze as haptic is graphically expressed in yH . al 2.4, 58c, which equates looking at female genitalia with intercourse. 75 The feasibility of walking around in the Mediterranean and managing to avoid casting one's eye on images is hard to imagine, perhaps as hard to imagine as going through one's life without gazing upon the body. And yet we know that late antique people trained their bodies-including their eyes-in precisely such ways. 76 In the fourth century, John Chrysostom recommended ocular dieting, so that one ''let the eyes fast . . . for looking is the food of the eyes.'' 77 Whether as a form of askesis or as self-protection or both, rabbis, Church fathers, and monks guarded their gazes.
Thus when it came to idolatry, Clement warned polytheists that they sinned not only in making images but also by looking at, or even hearing about, them.
78 For Clement, as for other apologists, this was connected to the very illogic of worshipping objects ''apprehended by sight,'' whether humanly produced or found naturally. 79 Cyprian situates the sin of idolatry amid a vivid array of sights-good, bad, ugly, benign, beneficent, and dangerous. 80 Elsewhere he castigates idol worshippers in visual terms, enumerating ''looking upon idols'' as part of the sin and recommending repentant tears as a way to wash such sinful eyes. 81 A deep sense of the participatory nature of vision coalesced around an abhorrence of the spectacles. Tertullian reasoned that by watching one not only became violent but that one was thereby implicated in the violence: intromissive visual theory at work. 82 Athenagoras put it bluntly, ''We see little difference between watching a man being put to death and killing him. So we have given up such spectacles.'' 83 Sight is not passive-it participates in, even affects, reality. The witness of violence becomes party to it. So, too, the rabbis declared that ''he who sits in the stadium, behold this one is a murderer. '' 84 Those such as Tertullian did not only inveigh against bad sights but also attempted to divert the gaze with the promise of goodly sights. 85 Tertullian's strategy recalls that of the Yerushalmi; he redirects the good Christian gaze away from the spectacles by promising righteous (non-) viewers the tantalizing ''free sight'' of the lurid and graphic writhing of sinners being punished (this is a good kind of violent spectacle). 86 The extramissive nature of vision allows us to understand these as punishing gazes. It was not just the viewer who was impacted by seeing but also the visual object. It is to this insight about the active power of the gaze that we now turn.
LOOKING AWRY: Y'AVODAH ZARAH 3.8, 43B
In a later passage in the same tractate of yAZ we find a trio of anecdotes about promenading pairs of rabbis that encounter idols. 87 In each case a rabbi asks his senior colleague about the appropriate behavior in the face of the image. In the first two instances, the latter tells the former to ''pass in front of it and blind its eyes. '' 88 In the final anecdote of the trilogy, R. 84. tAZ 2.7. That this pronouncement does not only point to homicidal omission in light of the exception to the rule that follows which allows one to go to the stadium to save lives is clear from the way it is also linked to participation in idolatry (tAZ 2.5) and to ''seeing the sorcerers and enchanters'' (tAZ 2.6). A variation of this story is embedded in a different narrative context, in yMK 3.7, 83c, with instructive additional elements. 90 The story features R. Yoh . anan walking along with R. Jacob bar Idi (the same person who invokes Nah . um bar Simai). They encounter R. Elazar; Yoh . anan is insulted when Elazar sees him (h . ame leh) and runs away instead extending the customary deference. 91 In a midrashic explanation that stresses vision, R. Jacob argues that unlike Palestinian rabbis, the Babylonians express respect toward their teachers by fulfilling the verse, ''the young men saw (ra'uni) me and withdrew (Job 29.8).'' This is the opposite of the apparently customary (Palestinian) greeting, such as repeatedly emphasized in a veritable manual for rabbinic respect rituals in yBik 3.3, 65c-d. 92 Here, Lev 19.32, ''you shall rise before the hoary head and honor the face of the elder,'' is the basis for a basic rule of rising and greeting the rabbinic teacher.
Amid its halakhic determinations yBik 3.3, 65c-d presents several anecdotes about rabbis who not only rise upon seeing their masters but also deliberately try to position themselves so that they might ''see'' them and then ''rise.'' 93 We witness a shift from the tannaitic rule in which 89. Ibid. In bAZ 50a-b R. Yohanan invokes the holy Nah . um to encourage people not to refrain from walking on flagstones made out of recycled idolatry (mercurius). Compare Mark the Deacon, Life of Poryphry, 76, in which marble from a destroyed temple is recycled into flagstones so as to be desecrated by being trodden underfoot, which caused people not to walk on them.
90. Par. yBer 2.1, 4b; yShek 2.6, 47a; bYev 96b-97a. In yMK 3.7, 83c a similar strategy of contrast is deployed. Babylonianstyled visual veneration of ''seeing and fleeing'' is contrasted with behavior appropriate toward an idol. After R. Yoh . anan complains to R. Jacob bar Idi about R. Elazar's disrespectful behavior, the pair go on to encounter an idolatrous image. When R. Jacob asks how they should proceed, R. Yoh . anan answers with the stock phrase: ''Would you accord it honor? Rather pass in front of it and blind its eye (same 'eneh).'' The phrase ''blind its eye'' has been understood in various ways. Some have revised it to ''blind your eye,'' a form of ''looking away,'' in order to harmonize it with R. Nah . um's visual vigilance. Particularly in light of the associated anecdotes in which Nah . um bar Simai is invoked, this might suggest passing in front of the idol but with an averted gaze. 98 Others read straightfor-94. For the tannaitic treatment of rituals of respect including rising before the sage, see Sifra Kedoshim 3.7 (tMeg 3.4). The source also prohibits one from ''closing one's eyes as if one has not seen'' the ''elder'' in order to escape the obligation to rise. wardly as ''blind its eye.'' 99 The material evidence of late antique iconoclasm against all kinds of images reveals that the eyes were among the most often struck organs, showing how ''the desecration of vital sensory organs . . . negates the 'power' of these images to see.'' 100 However, most have understood ''blind its eye'' metaphorically, as an instruction to act with deliberate disrespect that is tantamount to defacing the image. 101 In yMK 3.7, 83c, R. Yoh . anan must acknowledge that walking up to an object of worship (with no obeisance) constitutes this form of disrespect. He must therefore concede that by contrast R. El'azar's disappearing act was indeed a form of veneration. fig. sense to ignore.'' Same 'eneh is also used in the context of corruption and bribery and personal injury law, e.g., mBK 8.7. In tannaitic sources the expression is used in the context of personal injury. In most other iterations in Hebrew, Aramaic, and Syriac this word combination is either used adjectively to describe blindness or blind people, or (verbally) to refer to metaphorical acts of blinding-such as in bribery (e.g., Deut 16.19, ''a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise''). However, in contexts related to idolatrous images, the Bavli deploys the phrase in a literal fashion. Thus in b'AZ 43b (par bRH . 24b) Samuel instructs Rav Judah, who has a seal with a protruding image on it, to ''blind its eye'' and deface the image, thereby ''nullifying'' it and making it permissible for use. What may be a related expression, usually directed at Satan, is ''an arrow in your/his eye'' (bKid 81a, 30a, bSuk 39a, bMen 62a). The eye in this context seems to be related to the evil eye.
102. SongR 2.5 (ed. Vilna). For partial parallels, see yBer 9.2, 13d, ySan 11.5, 30b. In GenR 38.13 (ed. Theodor-Albeck, 3:360-64) Abraham uses similar lan-sites finds companionship with the scenario in yAZ 3.8, 43b. Both of these sources echo with what we know of the upheaval of the material landscape of fourth-century Palestine. This was a time of removal and replacement (and sometimes recycling) of ''pagan'' objects with Christian ones. 116 In this context in which idolatry shifted rather than disappeared, an imagined future of its total erasure from the land of Israel, and even beyond, must have been particularly appealing. 117 The kind of active seeing guaranteed by late antique understandings of extramissive vision allowed a minority to project its alternative vision upon a shifting viewscape whose material elements were largely controlled by others. Liturgical (or wishful) looking, then, is another example of an active gaze that affects, as much as it effects, the object of its glare.
CONCLUSION
Thus far I have laid out several modes of visually encountering idols. Perhaps the most idealized is gaze aversion, but there is also a form of gazing in situations in which the idol's status is compromised. We also find a mode of deliberately defiant looking. And finally, rabbinic texts show liturgical methods of negating (the sight of) idols, ultimately-in the Yerushalmi's dearest hopes-quite completely from the land. Thus we have come full circle from the notion that to look at an idol can be to worship it, to the notion that to look at an idol can be to denigrate it. This makes sense in a world in which vision can affect viewer and viewed.
I have treated the viewing strategies that ''idols'' elicited and which in turn helped to constitute ''idols.'' The archaeological record makes it clear that people in places such as Sepphoris, Scythopolis, Beth Shean, or Caesarea would have encountered a variety of images from statues to For biblical curses to be recited upon ''passing in front of a house of idolatry,'' as well as upon ''seeing them sacrificing to idolatry'' (as per the fourth-century amora R. Yose b. Abun), see yBer 9.1, 63b. On reciting ''blessed is he who is slow to anger'' when ''one sees mercurius,'' see yBer 9.1, 12d and bBer 54b.
117. Religio-political shifts in the Palestinian viewscape have as much explanatory power over the Yerushalmi's expansions of idolatrous sites as its general hermeneutic bent toward dialectical elaboration of tannaitic and biblical materials. 560 JQR 102.4 (2012) mosaics to images on more modest domestic objects like oil lamps. If, as Jaś Elsner has argued, our contemporary impulse to designate images one way or another (as Jewish, Christian, or pagan) is beset with problems and does a certain violence to the complexity and fluidity of the way objects appeared to and functioned for their contemporaneous viewers and users, then this makes even more vivid the urgency with which some ancients, such as rabbis, must have desired to know and control their material world. 118 In a basic sense the project of thinking through 'avodah zarah was part of an attempt to control the environment, at the very least on epistemic and ontic levels. The very designation of an object as an ''idol'' rabbinized it, even if under the veil of prohibition.
Such an object was to be viewed-literally-rabbinically (even for those rabbis who advocated that one should not look at all). Like Philo, like the Church fathers, rabbis increasingly sought to cultivate ways of seeing that marked not only the world and its objects but also themselves.
119 This is, in part, how we might understand the later valorization and honorific sanctification of visual virtuosos such as R. Nah . um bar Simai and R. Judah. In general, the rabbinic preoccupation with idolatry and its viewing is part of a larger effort to mark the gaze as Jewish. This gaze was, even at its ostensibly most disengaged and prohibitive, still deeply indebted to Greco-Roman visual theories, if not visual pieties. Vision, the sensory apprehension of an object, is never solely neutral or natural. The anxieties about the power of others' sacred images make their way into rabbinic texts in the vocabulary of idolatry and in the attempt to shape their visual encounter.
